Robust mechanisms for information elicitation by Aviv Zohar & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Robust Mechanisms for Information Elicitation
Aviv Zohar Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
School of Engineering and Computer Science
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
{avivz, jeff}@cs.huji.ac.il
Abstract. We study information elicitation mechanisms in which a principal
agent attempts to elicit the private information of other agents using a carefully
selected payment scheme based on proper scoring rules. Scoring rules, like many
other mechanisms set in a probabilistic environment, assume that all participating
agents share some common belief about the underlying probability of events. In
real-life situations however, the underlying distributions are not known precisely,
and small differences in beliefs of agents about these distributions may alter their
behavior under the prescribed mechanism.
We propose designing elicitation mechanisms in a manner that will be robust to
smallchanges inbelief.Weshowhowtoalgorithmicallydesignsuchmechanisms
in polynomial time using tools of stochastic programming and convex program-
ming, and discuss implementation issues for multiagent scenarios.
1 Introduction
Game theory and decision theory tools have long been used to predict the behavior of
rational agents in various settings. The common assumption made in game theory is that
agents seek to maximize their own gains and do not take any other aspect of encounters
into consideration. In games with an element of chance, which have an outcome that is
not deterministic, a given choice can lead to many outcomes, and there are many ways
to compare among actions. The most commonly used choice is to compare according
to expected returns from taking the action. Other methods incorporate other measures
such as risk. In any case, agents take into consideration the probability distribution
for various outcomes of the game, or for the type of opponent they are facing and its
selected actions.
When given the task of designing a system with interactions among agents, the de-
signer faces a different problem. The mechanism must be designed so as to induce a
rational, self-interested agent to behave in a predictable, desirable manner. The mecha-
nism design literature provides many successful examples of mechanisms that “battle”
the agent’s self interest and successfully achieve outcomes that are more socially ori-
ented, or are beneﬁcial to the designing agent in some way (see [9] for a review).
In this paper we explore mechanisms for information elicitation. We assume that
some principal agent wishes to buy information in a probabilistic environment, perhaps
to predict some future event. In the scenario we shall explore, the information that is
obtained can onlybeveriﬁed probabilistically.Therefore,thereisoftennoclear-cutway
to expose the seller of information as a liar. The proper incentives for truthfulness canbe obtained by carefully selecting the payments to the seller. In cases where common
knowledge of probabilities of events exists, it is easy to design the payment mechanism.
However, in many real-world situations, agents cannot know the underlying proba-
bility distributions of a game, but can only assess them by sampling or other methods.
Since the underlying probabilities cannot be directly known, there may be differences
among agents that have access to various sources of information, or that have different
priors over these distributions. The probability an agent assigns to some event is then
better characterized as a belief it holds regarding that event.
This problem is often addressed by direct revelation mechanisms that reveal to the
mechanism all needed information, including the type (or belief) of the participating
agent. The mechanism then takes this information into account and acts optimally on
behalf of the agent, eliminating any need to be untruthful. In information-trade settings
it is unlikely that the seller of information would be interested in direct revelation. Since
information is the primary commodity, revealing more of it to the mechanism is unwise,
and the agent’s beliefs about probabilities contain extra information.
In this sense, information elicitation scenarios are different from classical prefer-
ence elicitation problems. There are other important differences: in preference elicita-
tion scenarios, the participating agents focus less on the correctness of the information
given, and more on the ﬁnal outcome that is decided. This is often used by the mecha-
nism designer; for example, in an auction scenario, an agent will not overvalue an item
because it might actually be awarded an item it does not want for an inﬂated price. In
pure information elicitation, the information the agent gives will not affect the outcome
for him, but may only affect the payment it receives.
We suggest that in cases where there is some uncertainty regarding the beliefs of
agents, information elicitation mechanisms must be designed without full revelation
and furthermore, must be designed for robustness, not only against the manipulations
players may attempt, but also for differences in the beliefs they may hold. Our contri-
bution in this paper is to deﬁne a notion of belief-robustness in information elicitation
mechanisms. We show efﬁcient algorithms for ﬁnding robust mechanisms when such
mechanisms are possible, and examine the complications that arise when attempting to
extend the notion to the multiagent case.
2 Related Work and Mathematical Background
Research in artiﬁcial intelligence and on the foundations of probability theory [11] has
considered probabilities as beliefs, and several models have been suggested — for ex-
ample, probabilities over probabilities (which stirred much debate and controversy). [3]
examined the case of agents with uncertainty about the utility functions in the world.
In that case, an agent acts according to the “expected expected utility” it foresees as it
takes into consideration its own uncertainty.
The idea of ﬁnding robust solutions to problems, obviously, is not new. In control
theory for example, the problem of model uncertainty has been successfully tackled by
implementing robust control systems that rely on feedback to correct any errors in the
system’s behavior [19]. Research into robust solutions was carried out in many areas.
Examples include genetic algorithms [17], planning [7], and more.In [4,13] Conitzer and Sandholm proposed applying algorithmic mechanism design
to speciﬁc scenarios as a way of tailoring the mechanism to the exact problem at hand,
and thereby developing superior mechanisms. The designing algorithm is given an op-
timization problem — ﬁnd the best possible mechanism (according to some prescribed
criteria) that works for the setting at hand. They show various complexity results for the
mechanism design problem. When solving the design problem, the probability distribu-
tions are considered part of the input and serve as ﬁxed parameters for the optimization.
Other uses for information elicitation exist in multi-party computation [15,16],
where some function of the agents’ secrets is computed, but agents may have reser-
vations about revealing or computing their own secret. Another area in which informa-
tion elicitation is implemented is polling. It is often of public interest to know which
candidate is going to win in elections, but regular polls are notoriously inaccurate. To
overcome this poor performance, a different method has been suggested for the elic-
itation and aggregation of information, namely the information market approach [2,
18]. There, agents are free to buy and sell options that will pay them an amount that
is dependent on the outcome of some event (like some speciﬁc candidate winning an
election).
2.1 Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
Scoring rules [5,14,6] are used in order to assess and reward a prediction given in prob-
abilistic form. A score is given to the predicting expert that depends on the probability
distribution the expert speciﬁes, and on the actual event that is ultimately observed. For
a set Ω of possible events and P, a class of probability measures over them, a scoring
rule is then deﬁned as a function of the form: S : P × Ω → R.
A scoring rule is called strictly proper if the predictor maximizes its expected score
by saying the true probability of the event, and receives a strictly lower score for any
other prediction. That is: Eω∼p[S(p,ω)] ≥ Eω∼p[S(q,ω)] where equality is achieved
iff p = q. [5,6] show a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a scoring rule to be
strictly proper which allows easy generation of various proper scoring rules by selecting
a bounded convex function over P. Several commonly known scoring rules are the
spherical scoring rule S(p,ω) =
pω √P
ω0 pω0 2, the logarithmic scoring rule S(p,ω) =
log(pω), and the quadratic scoring rule S(p,ω) = 2pω −
P
ω0 p2
ω0.
An interesting use of scoring rules within the context of a multiagent reputation sys-
tem was suggested by [10], who use payments based on scoring rules to create the in-
centive for agents to honestly report about their experience with some service provider.
2.2 Stochastic Programming
Stochastic Programming [8] is a branch of mathematical programming where the math-
ematical program’s variables are not precisely known. A typical stochastic program
formulation consists of a mathematical program composed of constraints, a target func-
tion to optimize, and some range of allowed parameters to the problem with or without
a probability distribution over them. The program is then considered in a two-step man-
ner. The ﬁrst step involves the determination of the program’s variables, and in thesecond step, the parameters to the problem are selected from the allowed set. The vari-
ables set in the ﬁrst stage are then considered within the resulting instantiation of the
problem. Therefore they must be set in a way that will be good for all (or most) possible
problem instances. There are naturally several possible ways to deﬁne what constitutes
a good solution to the problem. In this paper, we use the following formulation:
Given a linear programming problem of the form:
min c · x
s.t.
Ax ≥ b
A is considered to be from an allowed set of parameters A. The solution x to the
mathematical program must be feasible for all possible A ∈ A. This form of robust
optimization is presented in [1], which discusses the property of the solution and offers
efﬁcient algorithms for solving such problems. In our case, the set A will consist of
the set of possible beliefs of agents, and the variables x will consist of the payments
given to agents according to the observed outcome and what they have reported. The
mathematicalprogramwillbecomposedofconstraintstoensuretruthtelling,individual
rationality, and effort investment on the part of the agents involved. These constraints
will be solved while optimizing some function — for example, the expected payment
of the mechanism designer can be minimized.
3 The Information Elicitation Scenario
The scoring rule literature usually deals with the case in which the predicting expert is
allowed to give a prediction from a continuous range of probabilities, but we look at
a slightly different problem: we assume each agent (including the principal agent) has
access to a privately-owned random variable that takes a ﬁnite number of values only.
Modeling the knowledge of agents in the form of random variables seems natural
when looking at scenarios with multiple agents, since once agents report the value of
the private variable, the principal has a clear and simple way of aggregating their infor-
mation with other agents’ reports. The discrete possibilities also allow us more freedom
in choosing our mechanism, since we do not have to induce truth-telling between in-
ﬁnitesimally different probabilities (as in the continuous case), and it will allow us to
tailor the mechanism to the exact scenario at hand. Knowledge that is sold is very of-
ten natural to present discreetly. For example, a person acquiring weather information
could be interested in the temperature forecast for the next day, but would not really
care if the exact temperature is off by a single degree. The required information in this
case might be given just to make a discreet choice of how warm to dress. Continuous
data would then be made discrete according to the various actions that it implies.
We shall denote the principal agent’s variable by Ω, and the variables of some agent
i by Xi, and assume that it costs the agent ci to access its variable and learn its precise
instantiation. Since access to information is costly, the seller may have an incentive to
guess at the information instead of investing the effort to learn the truth. Another possi-
bility is that the seller will miss-report if it believes a lie would help it gain more. Thebuyer of information, having only access to Ω (which may be only loosely correlated
with X) might not be able to tell the difference.
The discrete values each variable may take are assumed to be common knowledge.
We also assume that there is an underlying probability distribution Pr(Ω,X1,...,Xn)
which (for the time being) we shall consider as known to all participants. The mech-
anism designer needs to decide on a payment scheme which consists of the payment
to each agent i in case of an observation of ω by the principal and the reported ob-
servations x1,...,xn by the agents. We shall denote that payment by: ui
ω,x1,...,xn. A
payment scheme shall be considered proper if it creates the incentive for agents to enter
the game, invest the effort into revealing their variable, and to tell the true value they
found. These three requirements are deﬁned more precisely below.
3.1 The Single Agent Case
For ease of exposition, we shall ﬁrst look at the restricted case of a single agent (we
shall return to the multiagent case later). In the case of one participating agent with a
single variable, we need to satisfy three types of constraints in order to have a working
mechanism. For convenience, we drop the index i of the agent and denote by pω,x the
probability Pr(Ω = ω,X = x).
1. Truth Telling. Once an agent knows its variable is x, it must have an incentive to
tell the true value to the principal, rather than any lie x0.
∀x,x0 s.t. x 6= x0 X
ω
pω,x · uω,x >
X
ω
pω,x · uω,x0 (1)
Remember that pω,x is the probability of what actually occurs, and that the payment
uω,x0 is based only on what the agent reported.
2. Individual Rationality. An agent must have a positive expected utility from par-
ticipating in the game: X
ω,x
pω,x · uω,x > c (2)
3. Investment. The value of information for the agent must be greater than its cost.
Any guess the agent makes without actually computing its value must be less prof-
itable (in expectation) than paying to reveal the true value of the variable and re-
vealing it:
∀x0 X
ω,x
pω,x · uω,x − c >
X
ω,x
pω,x · uω,x0 (3)
Note that all of the above constraints are linear, and can thus be applied within a
linear program to minimize, for example, the expected cost of the mechanism to the
principal agent:
P
ω,x
pω,x · uω,x.
There are naturally cases when it is impossible to satisfy the constraints. The fol-
lowing proposition gives a sufﬁcient condition for infeasibility in the single agent case:
Proposition 1. If there exist x,x0 ∈ X and α ≥ 0 such that x 6= x0 ∀ω pω,x =
α · pω,x0, then there is no way to satisfy truth-telling constraints for x and x0 at the
same time.Proof. When looking at the two truthfulness constraints for x,x0 we get:
0 <
X
ω
pω,x · (uω,x − uω,x0) < 0 (4)
Which is a contradiction.
We can regard this feasibility condition as a requirement of independence between
the vectors ~ px , (pω1,x ...pωk,x) of any two different x,x0. We shall later see that the
dissimilarity between these vectors actually limits the robustness of the mechanism.
Next, we shall see that the condition described above is not only sufﬁcient for in-
feasibility, but it is also necessary. Moreover, once we have a feasible solution, we can
easily turn it into an optimal solution with a cost of c.
Proposition 2. If the probability vectors ~ px are pairwise independent, then there is a
solution to the design problem with a mean cost as close to c as desired. This solution
is optimal, due to the individual rationality constraint.
Proof. We can easily build an optimal solution by using a strictly proper scoring rule:
uω,x = α · S(Pr(ω|x),ω) + βω (5)
for some positive α, and some value βω. Since the independence relation holds for every
pair x,x0, the probabilities Pr(ω|x) are distinct and the scoring rule assures us of the
incentive for truth telling regardless of values of α,βω.
In order to satisfy the investment constraint one can scale the payments until the
value of information for the agent justiﬁes the investment. setting:
α > max
x0 [
c
P
ω,x
pω,x(S(Pr(ω|x),ω) − S(Pr(ω|x0),ω))
] (6)
satisﬁes that constraint for every x0. This is also shown in [10].
We have assumed here implicitly that the agent is risk-neutral and does not care
about the risk (which may not always be a suitable assumption). Finally, we can use the
βω values to satisfy the remaining individual rationality constraint tightly.
βω = β > c − α
X
ω,x
pω,x · S(Pr(ω|x),ω) (7)
We have thus shown a payment scheme with the minimal cost for every elicitation
problem where different observations of X entail different probability distributions of
ω. Later, we shall see that when considering robust mechanisms, the principal agent
must always pay more than this.
3.2 The MultiAgent Case
When constructing a mechanism with many participating agents, we should naturally
take into consideration the possible actions they are allowed to take. We will assumehere that agents cannot transfer information or utility among themselves, and must act
independently. If agents do act as a single coalition without each being self-interested,
they can be treated as a single agent that has access to many random variables which
it may learn independently. Other behavior models that include tension among agents
within a coalition, or coalition formation questions themselves, are also interesting but
are beyond the scope of this work.
In the multiagent case, the mechanism designer has more freedom in creating the
mechanism. As with the classic mechanism design problem, there is the option of build-
ing a dominant strategy mechanism, or solving with the weaker concept of a Nash
equilibrium. It is possible to design the information elicitation mechanism to work in
dominant strategies, simply by treating the variable Xi of each agent i independently
and condition payments to agent i only on its variable and the outcome variable Ω.
The mechanism is then designed for each agent as if it were a single-agent scenario.
However, it is also possible to design the mechanism to work only as a Nash equilib-
rium, and condition the payments to agent i on the reports of all other agents as well.
Each choice yields a different linear program that needs to be solved in order to ﬁnd
appropriate payments. This gives the designer further degrees of freedom with which
to operate. It is easy to see that there are cases where a dominant strategy mechanism
does not exist, but a mechanism that works in equilibrium does. For example, Table 1
presents such a scenario.
x1 x2 Pr(x1,x2) Pr(ω = 1|x1,x2)
0 0 1/4 0
0 1 1/4 1-￿
1 0 1/4 1
1 1 1/4 ￿
The elicitation scenario depicted here describes two random bits, each belonging to a different
agent. The outcome bit Ω is almost the XOR of the bits of the two agents. ￿ is assumed to be
positive but small.
Table 1. A Two-Agent Elicitation Scenario
A dominant strategy mechanism for agent 2 does not exist, since Pr(Ω = ω|X2 =
1) = Pr(Ω = ω|X2 = 0) which makes it impossible to induce truth telling for the
agent when conditioning the payments only on its report and on ω. Note, however, that
given agent 1’s report, ω is determined almost with certainty. This allows for a simple
mechanism for which truth telling is a Nash equilibrium: both agents get a payment if
the result matches the XOR of their reported bits, and a penalty if it does not.
A Mixture of Solution Concepts A common problem with mechanisms that work
in equilibrium only, is that there may be more than one equilibrium in the game. The
mechanismwehavejustdescribedisnodifferent.Consider,forexample,thecasewhere
￿ = 0. The strategy of always saying the opposite of the actual result is also in equilib-
rium when used by both players. A possible solution is to construct a dominant strategy
solution for some players, and design the solution for the other players to ensure that
good behavior is the best response to the dominant strategy of the ﬁrst group.For example, we can design a mechanism for the scenario from Table 1 in the case
of a positive ￿ in the following manner: agent 1’s payments are conditioned only on its
own reports in such a way as to induce good behavior. Such a mechanism is possible
for agent 1, since the variable Ω is slightly biased to match the variable X1. Since its
payment does not depend on the actions of agent 2, agent 1 has a dominant strategy
of truth telling. Agent 2’s payment is then designed with the assumption that agent 1’s
information is known. In that case, agent 2 can rationally decide that agent 1 is going to
tell the truth, and decide to do the same in order to maximize its utility.
This example can be easily generalized to a scenario with more agents. Once some
order ≺ is imposed over the agents, the mechanism can be designed so that the payment
to agent i will depend on its own report, on Ω and on any other agent j for which j ≺ i.
A mechanism designed in such a manner has only a single Nash equilibrium, and is thus
more appealing. The problem is that such a mechanism may not always exist, since we
are conditioning payments on less than all the available information. The order ≺ that
is imposed on the agents is also important and different orders may certainly lead to
different mechanisms. Later in this paper we shall discuss another appealing property
of mechanisms constructed in this manner: they lead to ﬁnite belief hierarchies when
agents need to reason about each other’s unknown beliefs.
4 Building Belief-Robust Mechanisms
We shall now relax the assumption of a commonly known probability distribution,
which we have used so far. We will still assume that events are governed by some
probability distribution, and that agents have “close” notions of those distributions. We
denote the beliefs of the mechanism designer by ˆ p and the belief of a participating agent
byp = ˆ p+￿,where ￿issmallaccording tosome norm.Wehave opted fortheL∞ norm1
for this paper, because it is easily described using linear constraints. Other norms may
also be used, and will yield convex optimization problems that are not linear. We now
deﬁne the robustness level of a given solution ~ u for some problem as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. We shall say that a given payment scheme uω,x is ￿-robust for an elicita-
tion problem with distribution ˆ pω,x if it is a proper solution to every elicitation problem
with distribution ˆ pω,x + ￿ω,x such that k~ ￿k∞ < ￿, and is infeasible for at least one
problem instance of any larger norm.
The deﬁnition above is very conservative, and requires feasibility for every possible
difference in beliefs. Another possible approach is to give a probability over possible
beliefs of the agents involved and require that the mechanism work well in a large
enough portion of the cases.
Now, notice that if we are given a solution to the mechanism design problem, we
can easily calculate its robustness level ￿ by solving a linear programming problem for
every constraint. We do this by looking for the worst-case ￿ω,x, which stands for the
worst possible belief the participating agent may hold. For example, we can write the
following program to ﬁnd the worst case for one of the truth-telling constraints:
1 This norm simply takes the maximum over all coordinates.min ￿
s.t. P
ω
(ˆ pω,x + ￿ω,x)(uω,x − uω,x0) ≤ 0
∀x,ω ˆ pω,x + ￿ω,x ≥ 0 P
ω,x
￿ω,x = 0
∀x,ω −￿ ≤ ￿ω,x ≤ ￿
In the program above, only ￿ and ￿ω,x are variables. Everything else is known and
ﬁxed. The linear problems for other constraints are easily built by substituting the ﬁrst
constraint above, with the negation of one of the constraints in the original design prob-
lem. Once we have solved similar linear programs for all the constraints in the original
design problem, we simply take the minimal ￿ found for them as the level of robustness
for the solution. The solution also provides us with a problem instance of distance ￿ for
which the algorithm fails.
We can also try and ﬁnd a solution with a given robustness level ￿ using the follow-
ing stochastic program:
min
P
ω,x
ˆ pω,x · uω,x
s.t.
∀x 6= x0 P
ω
pω,x(uω,x − uω,x0) > 0
P
ω,x
pω,x · uω,x > c
∀x0 P
ω,x
pω,x(uω,x − uω,x0) > c
where:
∀x,ω pω,x = ˆ pω,x + ￿ω,x
pω,x ≥ 0 P
ω,x
pω,x = 1
−￿ ≤ ￿ω,x ≤ ￿
Meaning that p is a distribution that is close to ˆ p up to ￿, according to the L∞ norm.
The stochastic program presented above is solvable in polynomial time, using con-
vex programming methods. It is shown in [1] that this can be done using standard con-
vex optimization methods, by producing a separation oracle that efﬁciently separates
between a given point and the convex set of feasible solutions. Their separation ora-
cle is produced by ﬁnding a problem instance from the set of possible instances which
the given point clearly violates. We have already seen that this counterexample can be
found in polynomial time by solving a linear program for every constraint in the original
formulation, and taking the worst case among all programs.
Now that we know how to solve the problem in polynomial time, what kind of so-
lutions can we expect to see? We have already seen that for the program instance for
which∀ω,x ￿ω,x = 0(whichcorrespondstotheoriginal,non-robustdesignproblem),
the mechanism designer must pay at least c, and that a mechanism that pays inﬁnitesi-
mally more than c always exists (if any mechanism exists). A robust payment scheme,
however, is required to cope with any possible belief variation Therfore, the paymentthe buyer must pay will be at least as bad as that of any speciﬁc problem instance, and
possibly even worse.
We can examine the robust problem formulation itself and show that here the prin-
cipal must pay more than in the non-robust case. Let us assume that we were given a
solution with a target function of γ =
P
ω,x
ˆ pω,x · uω,x. Since it is not possible (due to
the other constraints) that all uω,x are 0, then there exists a perturbation of beliefs ￿ω,x
which is negative for the largest uω,x and is positive for the smallest one, which then
yields a strictly lower payment than γ according to the belief of a participating agent.
Therefore, in order to satisfy the individual rationality constraint, γ must be strictly
larger than c, which means that the mechanism designer must pay more in expectation.
Deﬁnition 2. We deﬁne the robustness level ￿∗ of the problem ˆ p as the supremum of all
solution robustness levels ￿ for which the stochastic program is solvable:
￿∗ , sup
~ u
{￿|~ u is an ￿-robust solution to ˆ p} (8)
We shall now show that the robustness level of the problem in the single-agent case
is determined solely by the truth-telling constraints, and is thus independent of the effort
the selling agent invests in learning the information.
Proposition 3. If a given solution uω,x is ￿-robust with respect to the truth-telling con-
straints only, then it can be transformed into an ￿-robust solution to the entire design
problem.
Proof. We achieve this by simply scaling the solution to give robustness for the in-
vestment constraint and shifting it to add robustness to the incentive compatibility con-
straint. Since the solution is ￿-robust for the truth-telling constraints we have:
∀~ ￿ s.t. k~ ￿k < ￿ ∀x 6= x0 X
ω
pω,x(uω,x − uω,x0) > 0. (9)
If we sum over x we get:
X
ω,x
pω,x(uω,x − uω,x0) > δx0,~ ￿ > 0. (10)
Now multiplying every uω,x by a factor α = max
x0,~ ￿
c
δx0~ ￿ will not hurt any of the truth-
telling constraints, but will yield:
∀~ ￿ ∀x0 X
ω,x
pω,x(uω,x − uω,x0) > c (11)
which satisﬁes all of the investment constraints, for any possible belief change.
Next, the solution can be shifted to satisfy the individual rationality constraint, with-
out hurting the robustness with regards to the previous constraints. We can simply add
a constant β to every payment:
β > c − min
ω,x [uω,x]. (12)We will thus get a solution u∗ that satisﬁes
∀ω,x u∗
ω,x > c (13)
and therefore satisﬁes
X
ω,x
pω,x · u∗
ω,x >
X
ω,x
pω,x · c = c (14)
for all possible belief changes, which means that u∗ is ￿-robust.
4.1 Robustness Level in 2-Dimensional Case
In cases where there are only two outcomes Ω that the principal can see, there is a
simple way to ﬁnd the robustness level of the problem. In this case, the vectors ~ px are
all two-dimensional. If a mechanism exists at all (with any robustness level) then they
are pairwise independent, and therefore are spread over the ﬁrst quadrant of the plane.
Figure 1 depicts a scenario in two dimensions, where X takes 3 values.
The 2 axes correspond with the probabilities of the two possible results so all probability vectors
are in the 2D plane.
Fig.1. An Elicitation Scenario with 2 Possible Results
If we examine the truth telling constraints in vector form:
∀x,x0 ~ px · (~ ux − ~ ux0) > 0 (15)
and deﬁne ~ vx,x0 = ~ ux − ~ ux0, we can see that the constraints amount to ﬁnding linear
separators between the vectors ~ px. With this geometric interpretation in mind, a robust
solution is one where perturbing the vectors ~ px slightly will not make them cross over to
the other side of the hyper-plane deﬁned by~ vx,x0. This amounts to ﬁnding large-margin
separators between the vectors — these are separators that are of maximal distance from
the points they separate.
In the two dimensional case, as vectors are spread out on the plane, it is most im-
portant to separate adjacent vectors well as these vectors are the ones closest together.
The separation between non-adjacent vectors is always better. We shall not show the
full proof of this here (due to lack of space), but instead only outline some propositions
that lead to the proof. The next proposition will show us that in 2 dimensions, the best
separating hyper-plane is the same no matter which norm we use:Proposition 4. If points ~ p1,~ p2 ∈ R2 are separated by a plane~ v1,2 for which~ v1,2·(~ p1+
~ p2) = 0, then the distance of both points from the separating plane is equal under any
metric Li.
Now, without loss of generality, we can assume the vectors ~ p1 ...~ pn are ordered in
a clockwise direction. We can then ﬁnd n−1 vectors of the form~ vi,i+1 which are linear
separators between i,i + 1. We choose them to be the best linear separators possible
between the two points. This is achieved by a vector for which~ vi,i+1 ·(~ pi +~ pi+1) = 0.
In two dimensions, this condition determines ~ vi,i+1 up to a scaling factor that does not
change the separating plane.
The truth-telling constraints for x = i, x0 = i + 1 can now be satisﬁed by setting
the payments to satisfy ~ vi,i+1 = (~ ui − ~ ui+1). This can easily be done by arbitrarily
setting ~ u1 = ~ 0, and then proceeding to set the remaining vectors in sequence, where
~ ui+1 is set according to the equation with~ vi,i+1. Now that we have set all the payments,
we also have to show that this scheme satisﬁes all the other truth-telling constraints, for
non-consecutive values of x,x0, and that it satisﬁes them in a robust way. The relation-
ship between separating planes is given by ~ vi,j = −~ vj,i and ~ vi,j = ~ vi,k +~ vk,j.
The following proposition leads to the conclusion that setting the payments only
according to consecutive points works for the other points as well:
Proposition 5. If for all i the separator deﬁned by ~ vi,i+1 separates ~ pi from ~ pi+1 cor-
rectly then the distance of point ~ pi from the separator~ vi,i+1 is smaller than its distance
from the separator ~ vi,j for all j > i + 1.
Similarly, the distance of point ~ pi from ~ vi,i−1 is smaller than its distance from ~ vi,j
for all j < i − 1.
We have therefore seen that the actual limitation on the robustness of the mechanism
is the distance between consecutive vectors pi and pi+1 (or more precisely, the distance
between them and the optimal separating plane between them) in the two-dimensional
case. Taking the best separators between them leads to the most robust feasible solution
for all of the truth-telling constraints, which in turn can be transformed into a feasible
solution to the full robust design problem.
4.2 Robust Mechanisms for Multiple Agents
Designing robust mechanisms for multiple agents is a far more complex issue. The
designer must now take into account not only the possible beliefs of agents about the
probabilities of events, but also their beliefs about the beliefs of other agents. This is
especially true when constructing a mechanism that will work only at an equilibrium.
In order for an agent to believe that some strategy is in equilibrium, it must also be
convinced that its counterparts believe that their strategies are in equilibrium, or are
otherwise optimal. This will only occur if the agent believes that they believe that it
believes that its strategy is in equilibrium — and so on to inﬁnity.
Any uncertainty about the beliefs of other agents grows with every step up the belief
hierarchy. If agent A knows that all agents have some radius ￿ of uncertainty in beliefs,
and its view of the world consists of some probability distribution p it assigns to events,then it is possible that agent B believes the distribution is p0 and further believes that
agent A believes the distribution is some p00 which is at a distance of up to 2￿ from p.
With an inﬁnite belief hierarchy, it is therefore possible to reach any probability if we
go high enough in the hierarchy.
A possible solution to this problem is to use the mixture of solution concepts we
have seen before. If each agent’s payment only depends on the actions of agents before
it according to some order ≺, then it only needs to take their beliefs into consideration
when deciding on a strategy. The necessary belief hierarchy is then ﬁnite, which limits
the possible range of beliefs about beliefs. The most extreme case of this is to design
the mechanism for dominant strategies only. Naturally, a solution constructed in such a
way may be less efﬁcient or may not exist at all.
One may alternatively consider bounded rational agents that are only capable of
looking some ﬁnite distance into the hierarchy as possible subjects for the mechanism
design. An extreme example would be agents that believe that everyone else shares
their basic belief about the world, and do not reason about the beliefs of others at all
(but may, in fact, have different beliefs).
It is also interesting to note, that when agents have some common shared model
of the world, and with it some common prior over the possible beliefs of one another,
then as [12] shows, the iterated expectations each of them considers in its inﬁnite belief
hierarchy converge tothesame value. Thishintsatthe factthatinexpectation the beliefs
in the hierarchy drift towards the shared prior.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have discussed discrete information elicitation mechanisms and have shown that
such mechanisms can be efﬁciently designed to be robust to a wide range of beliefs held
by the participating agents. The robust mechanisms are naturally more expensive than
theirnon-robustcounterparts.Wealsodiscussedsomeofthecomplications arisingfrom
designing the mechanism for multiple participants, and have shown some cases under
which these complications can be handled easily. Further exploration in that direction,
and especially an attempt to cope with the inﬁnite belief hierarchies implied by the Nash
equilibrium concept, is still required. It would also be interesting to try and build other
belief-robust mechanisms, perhaps in the setting of preference elicitation.
Another interesting direction to explore is the area of collusion among agents. If
agents share information and payments among themselves, it is going to be harder to
design working mechanisms. Here, there are several levels of cooperation possible for
the agents, ranging from only helping other agents if there is personal gain in it, to
helping other agents in case it is beneﬁcial to the coalition as a whole. Exploring the
information elicitation problem from a coalition formation point of view would also be
interesting, as it can be expected that as agents reveal the values of their variables, the
coalitions they would want to join (in order to manipulate the mechanism) may change
depending on the result.
We have used tools of stochastic programming to solve for robust solutions, but
have only scratched the surface of potential uses of these tools. Other alternative prob-
lem formulations can be explored, especially formulations that include more detailedinformation about the possible beliefs of agents. These would ﬁt quite well into the
mainstream work done in stochastic programming.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore the area of partially-effective mechanisms.
These may fail to induce truth telling by agents in some cases, and only work well with
some probability. One might explore the tradeoff between the conﬁdence level of the
designer in the mechanism, and its robustness and cost.
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